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THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 1984

U.N. Team Says Chemical Arms Were Used in Iran

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., March 26 —A team of United Nations specialists who visited Iran reported today that there was substantial evidence that "chemical weapons, in the form of 'chemical bombs' had been used in the areas they inspected.

The said the weapons included mustard gas and nerve agents.

The investigators, who spent a week in Iran, did not specifically charge Iraq with using these weapons, but the report made clear that the chemical weapons had been used recently in border areas being contested by the two countries. Iran and Iraq have been at

war since 1980.

The report, drafted unanimously by the participants upon their return to Geneva, said that "the types of chemical agents used were bis-(2-chloroethyl)-sulfide, also known as mustard gas, and ethyl N, N-dimethylphosphoramide, a nerve agent known as Tabun." Mustard gas is a blistering agent which damages any tissue it touches.

No Evidence of Yellow Rain

However, the investigators added that "the extent to which these chemical agents have been used could not be determined within the time and re-

sources available to us." The scientists also found in their samples no evidence of mycotoxins, fungal poisons commonly referred to as "yellow rain."

Iraq's delegate to the United Nations, Riyadh S. al-Qaysi, said late this afternoon that he had just received the report and was forwarding it to Iraq.

"I am awaiting instructions from Baghdad," he said, "and unless I receive instructions, I will have no comment."

No one at the Iranian mission today was willing to comment on the report.

The four chemical weapons experts arrived in Teheran on March 13 accom-

panied by Iqbal Rizvi, a United Nations official in the office of Special Political Affairs. The United Nations delegation proceeded the next day to the war zone to examine evidence and to collect samples for further testing in specialized laboratories in Europe.

In Teheran, the specialists examined bomb fragments and casings believed to have transported the chemicals, clinically examined over 40 patients said to have been exposed to attacks by toxic agents and interviewed Government officials.

The Secretary General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, said today that in passing along the report of the investigators to the Security Council, he "cannot but deplore that their unanimous conclusions substantiate the allegations that chemical weapons have been used."

The team was made up of four chemical warfare experts, Dr. Gustav Andersson, a senior research chemist at the National Defense Research Institute in Sweden; Dr. Manuel Dominguez, an army colonel and professor of preventive medicine in Spain; Dr. Peter Dunn, a scientist at the Materials Research Laboratory, Department of Defense in Australia, and Col. Ulrich Imobersteg, Chief of Chemical Weapons Defense of the Swiss Army.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Tuesday, March 20, 1984

A17

High Pentagon Officials Opposing U.S. Actions on Arms Control

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer

Senior Pentagon officials, led by Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard N. Perle, are fighting to delay or prevent administration initiatives in several secondary areas of arms control, including some where Soviet leader Konstantin U. Chernenko has called for movement by the United States.

"Perle wants to stop the process because of what he believes are the pitfalls of negotiating with the Soviets," a top administration official said last week, "and because he fears real changes may be coming and he wants to head them off." Pentagon officials cited concern that election-year pressures could lead the White House to enter negotiations without

adequate preparations. Chernenko has called for movement by the United States in three areas of non-strategic weapons to prove its sincerity on arms control issues. He cited progress in eliminating chemical weapons, negotiations to ban anti-satellite weapons and ratification of the 1974 U.S.-Soviet treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests larger than 150 kilotons.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have focused attention on these areas since Moscow's negotiators walked out of the Geneva talks on medium-range and strategic nuclear weapons in December following deployment of American Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in western Europe.

Perle, however, has managed to

block any U.S. initiative on anti-satellite weapons and ratification of the threshold treaty, citing difficulties in verifying Soviet compliance in these areas. He has slowed movement on the chemical treaty and in development of a new U.S. position at the Vienna talks on conventional troop reductions in Europe. The development:

- A draft treaty to eliminate chemical weapons, which Secretary of State George P. Shultz said in January would be presented "in coming months," is still in interagency meetings, awaiting the Pentagon's plan for verification.

Perle called "inadequate" the verification provisions in a draft prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The threat of the Defense Department blocking the treaty was considered so great by other officials that the White House late last month told Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger in a memo that "it was the president's intention" to produce a draft treaty, according to a Pentagon official.

- An interagency study chaired by the Pentagon and recently delivered to the White House has determined there are "insurmountable problems" in verifying a ban on anti-satellite weapons, Perle said last week. As a result, the administration is not expected to propose entering negotiations to ban these weapons "at this time," Perle said.

Another top Reagan official said, however, that congressional pressure

may force the president to take some limited action in this area.

- An effort by ACDA Deputy Director David F. Emery several months ago to reconsider administration opposition to the threshold treaty, was quashed by another Pentagon study which confirmed, according to Perle, that the "treaty as drafted is unverifiable." Last year, the Soviets turned down a U.S. request to reopen the verification provisions on this treaty.

- Negotiation of conventional troop reductions in Europe is the one area where the Defense Department has agreed to an initiative. At first, the Pentagon opposed a State Department proposal that was close to a position offered last year by the Soviets. Subsequently, the Pentagon

prevailed over the State Department in determining the manner in which initial troop reductions would be counted, a complex approach which congressional sources said would guarantee a Soviet rejection and may not even have the support of U.S. allies in the talks.

Last week, Perle discussed his views before two Senate panels. On Wednesday, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that "arms control without Soviet compliance is nothing more than an exercise in unilateral disarmament."

He said there is a "possibility" of ... agreements in the future" but ruled out "ineffective agreements based upon wishful thinking that we have negotiated in the past, and which some propose today."

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Next likely Soviet signal in East-West ties: chemical weapon talks

By Elizabeth Pond

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Vienna

The next Soviet signal in East-West relations could come at the Geneva talks on banning chemical weapons. Or it could come in bilateral superpower relations.

It is unlikely to materialize at the Vienna troop reduction talks, however.

This seems to be the consensus of a number of allied diplomats close to the ongoing American, British, and West German attempt to work out a common modification of the NATO proposal of 1982. Such a modification could not be wrestled out in time for the March 16 reopening of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks.

The sources believe that Western differences can be resolved in the next few weeks — with West Germany scaling down its wish for a public demonstration of the West's readiness to compromise, and with the United States and Britain trimming their aversion to good-will gestures before end goals have been agreed on. The diplomats do not really expect, however, that any of the modified Western approaches now under consideration would elicit a major Soviet response.

The decade-old MBFR talks have in any case always been somewhat peripheral to the main superpower concerns of nuclear balance and détente. Moscow's sudden willingness last January to resume the Vienna talks was an exception; it was important as the first step back from Soviet suspension of nuclear and conventional arms control negotiations in late 1983 in reaction to NATO's new deployment of Euromissiles.

The subsequent death of Soviet party secretary Yuri Andropov and the succession of Konstantin Chernenko created a new opportunity for East-West, signaling a changed situation. But by then some direct political dialogue between the superpowers had been restarted and the Geneva talks on banning chemical weapons looked more promising as a medium for East-West communication. The MBFR talks were no longer needed as a surrogate for the nonexistent nuclear talks and a reassurance for public opinion.

Chemical weapons talks continue to be attractive to the Soviets partly because of their political ambiguity. The Soviet initiative tabled this year conveys a message of reasonableness to the West. At the same time, however, it holds the potential

of arousing anti-military passions in the future among West Germans in the same way that nuclear weapons issues did last year. It also could head off imminent American upgrading of chemical capability as the US reacts to the extensive Soviet chemical capability in Europe.

Chemical arms control — which is simpler than nuclear arms control or probably even European troops reductions — also holds out the possibility of an eventual high-level superpower meeting if enough progress is made.

The broader resumption of the superpower dialogue — along with President Reagan's conciliatory speech of Jan. 16 and Chernenko's toning down of Soviet anti-American rhetoric — provides another major channel for private and public East-West communication.

The already slim Soviet incentive for a summit prior to the US presidential election (if Reagan looked like a shoo-in) is fading as the November election begins to look somewhat more open. But any post-election summit, if desired, could be arranged directly at this point without requiring prior signaling in other form.

All this suggests that the MBFR talks will revert to their more limited technical function of trying to stabilize troop confrontations in Central Europe, without bearing any additional symbolic burden.